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Potentializing Newborn Screening
by Stefan Timmermans and Mara Buchbinder
Virtually all 4.25 million babies born annually in the United States are screened for more than 50 rare genetic
conditions. In a country plagued with widespread health-service access problems, this remarkable public health
achievement depends on policy visions of newborn screening as the linchpin of secondary prevention and saving
children’s lives. Based on ethnographic research and drawing from a semiotic framework, we illustrate that newborn
screening has had a much wider range of effects in the clinic than those anticipated by policy makers. How does
the disconnect between policy potential and clinical experience affect the technology? We demonstrate that only
some discrepancies are considered in policy circles and that instead, parents, geneticists, and policy makers renew
visions of potentiality that preserve the technology’s benefits in spite of evidence to the contrary. While rearticulating
the potential of technologies may help actors cope with situations that do not measure up to expectations, the
inevitable cost of reformulating potentiality once a technology has been implemented is that some accumulated
experiences will be rendered invisible.
In the US health care system—in which market structures
mediate access to services, and large portions of the popu-
lation are de facto excluded from care—newborn screening
represents an important exception. Ninety-nine percent of all
4.25 million newborns born annually are screened for rare
genetic conditions regardless of the family’s ability to pay
(Lloyd-Puryear and Brower 2010; Weaver et al. 2010).1 The
United States and many other countries have had universal
newborn screening programs for a handful of conditions, such
as phenylketonuria and hyperthyroidism, since the 1960s. In
2006, however, US newborn screening underwent a dramatic
expansion and standardization process when the American
College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) issued a report that
recommended screening for more than 50 additional con-
ditions (Watson et al. 2006).2 Soon after, the Secretary’s Ad-
visory Committee on Heritable Disorders in Newborns and
Children endorsed the recommendations,3 and individual
states adopted the expanded screening panel.
The confluence of factors that enabled this dramatic ex-
pansion involves both serendipity and concerted action by
parent advocates, medical professionals, government officials,
and industry representatives. Critical observers have focused
Stefan Timmermans is Professor and Chair of the Department of
Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles (264 Haines
Hall, 375 Portola Plaza, Los Angeles, California 90095-1551, USA
[stefan@soc.ucla.edu]). Mara Buchbinder is Assistant Professor in
the Department of Social Medicine and Adjunct Assistant Professor
in the Department of Anthropology at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill (333 South Columbia Street, 341A MacNi-
der Hall, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-7240, USA [mara
_buchbinder@med.unc.edu]). This paper was submitted 18 VI 12,
accepted 25 III 13, and electronically published 15 VII 13.
on the role of the ACMG report in breaking precedent with
40 years of screening principles, particularly the stipulation
that the individual patient must stand to benefit from screen-
ing (Baily and Murray 2008; Botkin et al. 2006; President’s
Council on Bioethics 2008). Here, we examine the potenti-
alities of newborn screening articulated at the policy level and
relate those visions to the experiences of making newborn
screening work in the clinic.
1. Infants born in hospitals, birth centers, or other medical settings
are screened before checkout, and infants born in domestic settings are
screened when parents register their child’s birth. Except for in the District
of Columbia, parents are not asked to provide consent for newborn
screening. Thirty states allow exemptions on religious grounds, and 13
states allow for any kind of exemption, but parents are rarely informed
of the possibility to opt out, and the default action is to screen (Toiv et
al. 2003). Screening targets include metabolic, endocrine, and hemato-
logical conditions as well as cystic fibrosis. While current screening tech-
nologies use a biochemical platform, the screening targets are considered
genetic disorders; thus, newborn screening is often described as a genetic
screening program. The screening is paid for by either public or private
insurance programs. Only the actual screening test is available to all,
however. Access to follow-up treatment is stratified based on ability to
pay or insurance coverage.
2. Before the expansion of newborn screening programs in the United
States, large discrepancies existed between different states in the number
and kind of screened disorders. Thus, a baby born in the United States
might be screened for eight or 30 conditions depending on the state in
which she was born—a situation that was unacceptable for many health
advocates. See AAP Newborn Screening Task Force (2000).
3. The US Health Resources and Services Administration commis-
sioned the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in
Newborns and Children in February 2003 to advise the secretary of Health
and Human Services on how to reduce genetic-disease-related morbidity
and mortality in newborns and children. Committee members, who are
appointed by the secretary, include medical, technical, or scientific pro-
fessionals with expertise in children’s genetic disorders as well as members
of the public with a special interest in heritable disorders.
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The process of charging a biomedical technology with po-
tentialities creates a series of real-life semiotic challenges.
Charles S. Peirce’s semiotic grammar classifies signs according
to his broader universal tripartite system of hierarchically
ranked logical categories. This system offers a vantage point
from which to explore the power of potentiality relative to
realities. In Peirce’s system, “firstness” involves only “possi-
bilities, and nothing more” (Peirce 1992:269). “Secondness”
refers to the level of actualization, the realm of “hard facts”
(Peirce 1992:268). “Thirdness” refers to generalizations. The
key issue for our purposes here is the fundamental hierarchical
relationship between the three levels. Potentiality implies be-
ing unrelated to other phenomena: “For as long as things do
not act upon one another there is no sense or meaning in
saying that they have any being” (Hartshorne, Weiss, and
Burks 1931–1958:25). For potentiality, we do not know
whether signs will ever be realized. Actuality presumes po-
tentiality yet differs from it through resistance and effort. With
actuality, there is a “struggle” involved, an effect or “happen-
ing then and there” that leads to some modification (Harts-
horne, Weiss, and Burks 1931–1958:324; emphasis in origi-
nal). Actuality requires relationships to other phenomena.
Peirce thus presumed a hierarchical relationship between po-
tentiality and actuality (and actuality and generalizability),
with the latter superseding the former. However, Peirce argued
that at any point, multiple semiotic relationships could be
dynamically enacted, complicating the overall tension be-
tween potentiality and actuality.
Drawing from Peirce’s semiotics and pragmatism,4 we ex-
amine the critical relationship between potentiality and actual
experience for newborn screening. How do visions of a bio-
medical technology’s potential affect the experiences of par-
ents and clinicians? Alternatively, how does a discrepancy be-
tween actual and projected experiences reflect back on the
biomedical program? In light of this special issue of Current
Anthropology, we describe a set of actors approaching poten-
tiality in terms of the first meaning identified by Taussig,
Hoeyer, and Helmreich (2013) in their introduction to this
issue: as “a hidden force determined to manifest itself—some-
thing that with or without intervention has its future built
into it.” Potentiality, in this sense, is a political project that
imbues, evaluates, and channels claims about, in this case, the
power of biomedical technologies to achieve certain aims. As
Peirce pointed out, potentiality is disconnected from what
may actually happen but paves the way for desirable futures.
Once technologies are implemented, the technology may or
may not reach that projected potential. When a technology
does not live up to its potential, it reflects a shift in the
meaning of potentiality, which now appears as “a latent pos-
sibility imagined as open to choice, a quality perceived as
available to human modification and direction through which
4. Peirce considered pragmatism a principle of inquiry and account
of meaning that emphasizes that meaning derives from practical con-
sequences (Houser 1998).
people can work to propel an object or subject to become
something other than it is” (Taussig, Hoeyer, and Helmreich
2013). In the case of innovative technologies, this choice usu-
ally comes down to discontinuing technologies because they
fell short of promises or using technologies for new ends. But
these are not the only options for technologies that do not
reach their potential. They may also be imbued with even
grander potentialities. In that case, potentiality is not only
instrumentally independent of already present experiences but
also helps to buffer inconvenient truths.
We will work out our argument in three steps. First, we
examine how policy makers formulated a semiotic network
for the potential benefits of newborn screening before the
implementation of new screening technologies. We demon-
strate that in various policy forums, stakeholders settled on
a shared meaning of newborn screening as the cornerstone
of secondary prevention to avoid severe disability and save
newborn lives. We then draw on ethnographic data collected
in a California genetics clinic to examine how genetics staff
and parents of children who received positive newborn screens
related their experiences to the potential of the newborn
screening program. We show here that newborn screening
had a much wider range of effects than those anticipated by
policy makers. Finally, we examine how the discrepancy be-
tween policy potential and clinical experiences affected the
technology. We note that only some discrepancies were con-
sidered in policy circles. Instead, parents, geneticists, and pol-
icy makers renewed visions of potentiality that preserved the
technology’s benefits in spite of evidence to the contrary.
While harking back to the potential of technologies may help
actors cope with situations that do not measure up to ex-
pectations, the inevitable cost of reformulating potentiality
once a technology has been implemented is that some salient
experiences will be rendered invisible.
Policy Potentialities
Technology designers—everyone involved in bringing a tech-
nology into use—charge new technologies with potential in the
sense of a not yet realized desirable future attainable with their
implementation. They deliberately or implicitly imagine an
ideal scenario in which people will use the technology to achieve
goals (Akrich 1992; Woolgar 1991). Designers presume shared
interests, aspirations, competencies, and ideal users following
technological “scripts” for implementation. These presump-
tions become inscribed to varying degrees in operating pro-
tocols and the material software and hardware of the tools
(Hedgecoe 2004). Such presumptions also extend to a physical,
legal, and economic infrastructure that enables the technology
to do its work (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003). In fact, formu-
lating technological expectations is instrumental to accumu-
lating resources and buy-in from various stakeholders who
might otherwise remain at cross-purposes (Borup et al. 2006).
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The expansion of newborn screening depended on the
adoption of a multiplex technology—tandem mass spectrom-
etry—which allowed simultaneous screening for multiple bio-
chemical analytes using a single specimen.5 The previously
mentioned ACMG report was critical to the adoption of tan-
dem mass spectrometry. The Maternal and Child Health Bu-
reau of the Health Services and Resources Administration
commissioned the report by asking the ACMG to review the
evidence for expanding newborn screening. Although the re-
port was presented as a scientific evaluation, it had the policy
function of justifying the expansion of newborn screening.
Critics charged that the report relied on a weak scientific
methodology and was strikingly void of compelling evidence
in favor of screening during a time in which evidence-based
medicine had substantially codified medical decisions (Moyer
et al. 2008). If “science,” as Latour (1988:228) put it, “is
politics by other means,” the unequivocal recommendations
for expansion strongly suggested not a neutral evaluation of
scientific research but advocacy science in which stakeholders
selectively marshaled scientific evidence for preordained pol-
icy goals. Not surprisingly, then, the report articulated the
potential benefits of newborn screening in great detail:
States and territories mandate newborn screening of all in-
fants born within their jurisdiction for certain treatable con-
ditions that may not otherwise be detected before devel-
opmental disability or death occurs. Newborns with these
disorders typically appear normal at birth. The testing and
follow-up services of newborn screening programs are de-
signed to provide early diagnosis and treatment before sig-
nificant, irreversible damage occurs. Appropriate compli-
ance with the medical management prescribed can allow
most affected newborns to develop normally. . . . As the
model for public health–based population genetic screening,
newborn screening is nationally recognized as an essential
program that aims to ensure the best outcome for the na-
tion’s newborn population.6 (Watson et al. 2006:S15)
With every phrase in this passage, newborn screening is
semiotically enriched with benefit potential. The main ratio-
nale behind newborn screening is secondary prevention: the
detection of disease in an asymptomatic population to im-
plement therapeutic interventions and offset symptom de-
velopment. The goal is the prevention of “developmental dis-
ability or death” and “significant, irreversible damage.” The
mechanism of “early diagnosis and treatment” followed by
“appropriate compliance with the medical management” leads
to the promise of “most” infants “to develop normally.” The
text situates secondary prevention within a specific vision of
human vulnerability and medical salvation. Metabolic and
other diseases constitute a hidden danger, meaning that with-
5. Note that newborn screening rests on a biochemical analysis of
metabolites in the blood even though it provides information about
genetic conditions. Some follow-up tests involve mutation analyses.
6. The analysis of this quote is based on Timmermans and Buchbinder
(2013).
out newborn screening no one would suspect that the infants
were at risk: “newborns with these disorders typically appear
normal at birth.” Because no one would suspect that a “nor-
mal”-appearing infant is actually sick, the implication is that
when symptoms do appear, it may already be too late.
Potentiality is further encapsulated by the culturally
charged image of newborns at risk, which plays on the idea
of babies as icons of vitality and future potential (Meckel
1998). Underlying newborn screening is a view of human
plasticity: intervening in biology at the beginning of life prom-
ises lifelong health benefits. The technology’s potential rein-
forces the perception of infants as adaptable during a critical
period of development. However, “testing and follow-up”
suggests that screening by itself is insufficient: a lifelong in-
tegrative systemic approach is required to achieve health ben-
efits. Prevention is urgent: “early” intervention matters greatly.
The program also rests on universality: as a “public health–
based population genetic screening” program, all infants will
be screened. The potential of newborn screening to prevent
disease thus rested on a view of vulnerable but malleable
biological humanness. The semiotic translations articulated
in the ACMG report specified a focused set of highly valued
outcomes: universal newborn screening was the means to
prevent developmental disability and death throughout the
life course.
Although the ACMG report suggested an ideal scenario to
prevent hidden dangers in newborns that would require quick
action as part of comprehensive health care, it also inserted
qualifiers and conditional clauses that alerted the reader to
possible constraints thwarting the promise of screening pro-
grams. Such hedges are apparent in the notion that “most”
infants will be helped from screening, and any success rests on
“appropriate compliance with the medical management.” Later
in the ACMG report, it became clear that not all of the con-
ditions recommended to the universal screening panel required
urgent diagnosis or had effective treatments available. The re-
port distinguished between a primary and secondary set of
conditions. While primary conditions were established con-
ditions for which newborn screening should have preventive
potential, secondary conditions were derived from the primary
set and would be identified by screening for the core panel.
The preventive payoff for secondary conditions was likely min-
imal, but the authors argued that results should be reported
because withholding this information would be paternalistic.
When the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Heritable
Disorders in Newborns and Children endorsed the ACMG
report, the March of Dimes, along with other advocacy or-
ganizations, launched a campaign to urge states to adopt
screening for the recommended panel. As is often the case,
patient advocacy groups aimed to legitimize innovation by
performing the technology’s promise (Rabeharisoa and Callon
2002). One of the fathers in our study testified to the Cali-
fornia legislature to advocate on behalf of expanded newborn
screening. His daughter had been diagnosed with a metabolic
disorder during a pilot screening program and had remained
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healthy with treatment. In an interview, the father described
how he would recount his experience with a positive outcome
from newborn screening and then hand the microphone to
a parent whose child had been severely disabled because of a
metabolic disorder that might have been detected with new-
born screening. The child diagnosed by newborn screening
embodied the realization of the technology’s potential to save
lives and prevent disability once screening is implemented.
As an example, the father’s testimony implied the avoidance
of danger, which could be multiplied for many others. The
other parent’s testimony implied a past of suffering that could
be left behind. The contrast foreshadowed a future in which
prevention at the beginning of life is indeed feasible with
screening technologies. The juxtaposition between a child
saved through newborn screening and one severely disabled
without newborn screening further positioned the screening
program as the required causal agent of lifesaving efforts.
Underlying the policy push for expanded screening again re-
sides the notion of a flexible human biology amenable to
biomedical interventions to prevent disability and death.
Articulating the potential of newborn screening to save
babies by preventing the onset of disease did much political
work to implement new screening technologies. Newborn
screening advocates created a semiotic network in which the
ability of multiplex technologies to screen for multiple con-
ditions was proposed as an “obligatory point of passage” (La-
tour 1987:182) to prevent disability and death among new-
borns. Connected with written and verbal signs that varied
from qualities such as avoiding pain and suffering—embed-
ded in common indexes such as flow charts, bibliographies,
credentials, and diagrams throughout the report—and en-
hanced with the symbol of the endangered newborn, the
screening technologies scaled up to people, activities, systems,
values, other tools, and a common purpose of secondary pre-
vention. Although the network was wide and diverse, the
anticipated potential was singularly focused on highly valued
outcomes. The general message to policy makers, parents,
public health officials, and geneticists was clear: if you want
to save babies, you need to invest in newborn screening. How-
ever, although the translation of newborn screening as ben-
eficial rested on an argument of biological plasticity, the ap-
pendixes of the ACMG report made clear that some
conditions added to the screen were not necessarily amenable
to early intervention. For some conditions, preventive mea-
sures did not exist, and about other conditions, little was
understood about their biological parameters even to diagnose
them conclusively.
Clinical Experiences
Peirce’s pragmatist maxim suggests that the meaning of phe-
nomena become apparent in the practical consequences they
produce.7 It is through the effects that we know what newborn
screening is. Newborn screening is thus what it does. Screen-
ing advocates have imbued newborn screening with potential,
but it is in the lived experiences of families and geneticists
that newborn screening emerges as consequential.
In the clinics across the United States where families meet
geneticists to discuss positive screening results, newborn
screening experiences were much more diverse than antici-
pated. Secondary prevention may occur at a population level,
but the pressing concerns in the clinic relate to the clinical
relevance and broader meaning of a positive screening result
for a specific baby. Here, we will draw on our ethnographic
observations of 75 newborn screening patients we followed
in a metabolic-genetic clinic over a 3-year period. We observed
and audio-recorded 193 clinical consultations between fam-
ilies and the genetics staff, attended the weekly genetics team
meetings at the end of each clinic day, consulted patients’
medical records, and interviewed parents and clinicians about
their experiences with newborn screening.
We limit our analysis to explicit statements about newborn
screening made by geneticists and parents to explain the
child’s current situation. In those moments, newborn screen-
ing as object was charged with signs aimed to advance a new
set of meanings regarding what the screening program was
about. Such metacommentaries were uncommon because
most of the clinical interactions focused on the immediate
tasks of follow-up testing and the implementation of treat-
ment. Occasionally, however, geneticists and parents reflected
on whether the current situation conformed to the intended
potential of newborn screening. At such junctures, newborn
screening became embedded in more expansive semiotic net-
works.
Alignment of Potential with Clinical Experience
In some cases, the patient’s diagnostic journey aligned with
the potential of newborn screening as envisioned by policy
makers. Thus, a geneticist reviewed the events for one patient
diagnosed with short-chain acyl-CoA dehydrogenase defi-
ciency (SCADD):8 “So, the last time we saw him back in
January, we went over his newborn screening results. And
then we did the blood test to look for the genetic changes
with the SCADD. So, what they did show is, they do show
that he has the change—changes that would explain the
SCADD. So, it was real; the newborn screening was real. But
we’ve been treating him as if he’s had that the whole time.”
The last sentence refers to the fact that the clinicians and
family had already implemented precautionary measures—in
this case, feeding the boy frequently to avoid periods of pro-
longed fasting, which can result in metabolic crisis—even
7. On the relationship between pragmatism and semiotics, see Meyer
(2008).
8. SCADD is a fatty acid oxidation disorder that can lead to difficulties
metabolizing certain fats.
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though the geneticists were not yet certain whether the screen-
ing results indicated the “real” presence of the disease or even
whether SCADD was a true disease.9 Here, we have the ele-
ments of early diagnosis and early treatment arranged as in-
tended by the policy logic of newborn screening. The mother
of another patient observed, “The great thing I guess you can
say is that his condition was detected in a newborn screening.
So we knew what his condition was as opposed to finding
out when it was too late. Or what have you.” This mother
reiterated the key intended benefit of newborn screening: de-
tecting patients before symptoms occur.
Unfulfilled Potential
False positives. The experiences of most families in our study
visiting the clinic for follow-up of positive newborn screening
results, however, differed from the intended potential of sec-
ondary prevention. Many children did not walk away with a
clinical diagnosis. For each clear diagnosis there were many
more false positives. Between July 2005 and May 2009, the
ratio in California was about 4.5 false positives for every true
positive (Feuchtbaum, Dowray, and Lorey 2010). This is be-
cause a screening test depends on a balance between sensitivity
(the ability to identify actual cases) and specificity (the ability
to rule out negative cases). Inevitably, screening programs
identify some false positives and let some false negatives slip
by. “Newborn screening is a screen,” a geneticist explained to
one couple, “which means it just gives us a general idea of
who to look at more closely than others. But it is not a
diagnostic test. It does not tell us for sure that this is what
he has.” The geneticist did not present newborn screening as
a powerful preventive measure but rather downgraded it to
an initial triage mechanism.
Faced with ambiguous results, geneticists’ modus operandi
was to conduct increasingly specific follow-up tests. This typ-
ically involved a series of repeat biochemical tests followed,
if necessary, by DNA sequencing. The determination of a false
positive was the outcome of a lengthy process that could take
days, weeks, and in some cases months to figure out. Mean-
while, geneticists were still faced with the original positive
result, and the possibility of a disorder could not be fully
excluded even if other evidence suggested a false positive. In
this interim period, geneticists clung to the possibility of a
false positive while also leaving open the possibility of true
disease. A geneticist explained, “So one thing about these
disorders is that the newborn screening is a very sensitive test
so it could pick up levels that are abnormal, okay. And then
after that we find out that, for example, if we test DNA mu-
tation that it might not be a true—that’s something that we
9. One of the consequences of screening large, asymptomatic popu-
lations via newborn screening was that clinicians’ understanding of dis-
eases shifted radically, including whether some conditions previously con-
sidered diseases were clinically relevant disorders or benign forms of
biogenetic variation. See Timmermans and Buchbinder (2012).
call a false positive and in that case, it may not really mean
too much.”
In such explanations, newborn screening emerged as a
more ambivalent technology than policy visions suggested: it
produced, as one geneticist put it, “many more” false positives
that could unnecessarily alarm parents. As social scientists
predicted about standardizing technologies more generally
(Star 1991), parents facing a false positive lost something they
did not know they had (Grob 2011). During pregnancy, they
had braced themselves for interrupted sleep, feeding sched-
ules, and juggling a newborn with all other aspects of life.
Instead, they were forced to ponder the possibility of a met-
abolic disorder based on a seemingly authoritative blood test.
Yet the determination of a screening result as a false positive
is at least a final determination that serves as a clinical ex-
oneration of the child.
Patients-in-waiting. Besides false positives, a second way in
which clinicians’ and families’ experiences with newborn
screening differed from policy aims was the situation of lin-
gering uncertainty. For 42 patients in our study, follow-up
testing did not unequivocally clarify the status of the disorder
because a second mutation could not be found or a genetic
test was not available clinically. In other words, the sign eluded
interpretation. Clinicians and parents continued to wonder
whether the child had a disease or simply a nonpathological
form of biogenetic variation. We have referred to these pa-
tients as “patients-in-waiting” because they were kept under
medical supervision in a liminal state between pathology and
an unmarked state of normality for a prolonged period of
time (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010). These patients
faced an iatrogenic (because it was screening generated) di-
agnostic odyssey.
Geneticists directly attributed the situation of patients-in-
waiting to the unintended consequences of newborn screen-
ing. A geneticist relayed to one couple the following: “Right.
Yeah, so, that’s the pluses and minuses of doing this newborn
screening—it’s good when you can find something and you’re
sure, but then, when you’re kind of in this gray area, you’re
kind of just not sure.” “Kind of just not sure” refers to the
lingering uncertainty due to a positive screening result that
resisted dismissal from the clinic.
Such positive newborn screening results nevertheless de-
veloped a social and clinical life of their own. One geneticist
explained to a mother that he had little choice but to keep
seeing her son as a patient even though the condition—hy-
perprolinemia10—was likely benign:
One of the amino acids in the blood is very much elevated,
but it’s a disorder in which 90 plus percent of the kids with
it are completely normal. And it’s a disorder for which
there’s no treatment anyway. Maybe even more than 90%
10. Hyperprolinemia is a metabolic disorder characterized by a
buildup of the amino acid proline in the blood.
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are normal because until newborn screening, we would
never detect it automatically. We only found it in people
who were having tests for other reasons. So I don’t think
this amounts to a hill of beans. I don’t think this is mean-
ingful. What I don’t want to do is throw you out on the
street because that’s not fair either. But I would anticipate
no illnesses.
Even though the results did not add up to “a hill of beans,”
the geneticist felt compelled to keep monitoring the patient.
The initial positive result created a momentum of clinical
supervision that was difficult to scale back even once signs
pointed away from disease. Similarly, families prioritized new-
born screening as a pressing concern during the period of
retesting. It structured visits to the clinic, affected how parents
perceived their newborn, fostered increased vigilance, and de-
pending on the condition, changed the infant’s diet and sleep-
ing patterns. Newborn screening thus came with a social op-
portunity cost for parents.
The standard modus operandi of ordering increasingly re-
fined tests might not offer resolution in newborn screening
because, as a geneticist explained, “Now, of course, when you
don’t find a second mutation, it’s always possible that it’s
there and you just didn’t detect it.” Newborn screening thus
exposed the limits of the metabolic-genetic knowledge base
that had been hinted at in the appendixes of the ACMG
report: the program was screening for at least some poorly
understood and ambiguous conditions. The result was that
newborn screening had mixed effects. As one geneticist said,
There have been a lot of benefits to the newborn screening
and some frustrations with the newborn screening. The ben-
efits are that it’s caught a lot of things. Otherwise babies
wouldn’t have been treated till they had gotten sick later in
life. But one of the things that’s a little tricky about the
screening—and it’s true in this case here—is that sometimes
it’s designed to be more sensitive so that it catches every-
body. But sometimes it will catch people who ultimately
won’t go on to develop symptoms or who might in fact
even be normal or have a normal variant of their enzymes.
Rather than offering clarity on disease status, newborn
screening may cloud the clinical picture. In some cases, some
metabolic and genetic markers of disease are present but not
in a form that mounts sufficient evidence to count as true
disease. Because the screening signs fall outside the expected
normal range, they cannot be dismissed out of hand. Rather
than the potential to save lives, the technology produces an
experience of extended ambiguity in which parents and cli-
nicians grapple with the fundamental question of whether a
child is a patient or not.
Harm due to screening. A third way in which experience in
the clinic deviated from policy potentials occurred when the
positive screen harmed families. The ability of newborn
screening to do damage was clearest in the situation of a
couple that had lost a child because of very-long-chain acyl-
CoA dehydrogenase deficiency (VLCADD).11 The child had
screened positive at birth and remained asymptomatic but
nevertheless died suddenly at 11 months after developing in-
fluenza. In a subsequent pregnancy, the parents opted for
chorionic villus sampling (CVS) to test for VLCADD pre-
natally. The fetus was identified as a heterozygote carrying the
father’s mutation. This prenatal genetic test should have pro-
vided more conclusive information than the newborn screen,
but when the newborn screen indicated a slight elevation for
a secondary biomarker of VLCADD, the family was sum-
moned to the clinic.
The parents’ agony on contemplating the possibility that
their son could have VLCADD after all was palpable in the
examination room. The mother was teary-eyed throughout
the consultation, holding her son tightly. The geneticist
opened the conversation with strong reassurance: “I don’t
doubt for a minute that the baby is unaffected, that the [CVS]
is correct.” The mother explained the grounds for her anxiety:
“Well, we were told to be optimistic with our first child and
we retested her and everything. So, we were, you know, we
were trying to be optimistic and then got the bad news, you
know, so now it’s like, it’s hard to be optimistic right now.”
Pointing to the mother and infant, the geneticist replied, “You
and he are collateral damage of the newborn screening. And
since he’s too young to care, it’s you who are the collateral
damage.” The term “collateral damage” refers to unintended
outcomes and is commonly used as a euphemism for civil
casualties in war situations. By using this term, the geneticist
left no ambiguity that newborn screening could be harmful
and that this harm was inevitable in screening programs.
In the end, the follow-up test confirmed the CVS results,
but by then the damage had been done. The harm of newborn
screening resided in alarming parents who had already lost a
child to a disease that their next child could be affected by
the same disease, even though a prenatal test should have
ruled out the presence of VLCADD. Here, the potential of
newborn screening to issue a warning signal trumps the sit-
uated reality of parents and clinicians for whom the news was
not only unnecessary but also experienced as a devastating
blow because it rekindled the possibility that the newborn
was affected after all.
Symptomatic patients. The final way that the experiences of
parents and clinicians did not align with the promise of
screening is with symptomatic children. In the case described
above, although the couple’s older child was diagnosed
through newborn screening, the advance knowledge of a dis-
order was insufficient to avoid sudden death. Eleven children
in our study exhibited developmental delays and other symp-
toms of metabolic disorders despite early detection through
newborn screening. Several developed symptoms before the
11. VLCADD is a fatty acid oxidation disorder that can lead to the
inability to metabolize certain kinds of fats.
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return of screening results, and three children died. These
children were true positive cases, but treatment did not pre-
vent the manifestations of serious illness. For these children,
the promise of secondary prevention dissolved into the harsh
reality of unrelenting disease momentum. In fact, newborn
screening’s potential became a burden in such cases because
it confronted families with the failed promise of salvation.
In the clinic, then, a diverse and nuanced set of newborn
screening consequences developed during interactions be-
tween geneticists and parents (Mol 2002), only some of which
fit the potential of the screening program to prevent the onset
of disease trajectories. The growing experience of expanded
newborn screening revealed the boundaries of infants’ bio-
logical malleability and limits to intervention. Biological re-
calcitrance emerged as a lack of understanding of diseases in
the sense that the screened conditions did not behave as they
had been understood. Clinicians wondered whether newborn
screening identified true diseases or clinically insignificant ab-
normalities. As such, disease ontology in its “natural history”
and biological parameters became an object of intense knowl-
edge production. What are these conditions we are screening
for? What treatments are indicated? How long should we treat
these newborns? Answering questions such as these also led
to revisions of how much intervention is possible at the be-
ginning of life.
This biological reassertion of the boundaries of human
plasticity is also apparent in the observation that even if cli-
nicians knew about the possibility of disease and took rec-
ommended preventive measures, the disease could still lead
to disability and death. The key question was whether the
screening information provided was actionable in the sense
of providing advance knowledge that lends itself to interven-
tion. Throughout most of the interactions in the clinic, ge-
neticists were preoccupied with figuring out what the newborn
screening results implied for a child’s health: did they herald
a true disorder or a clinically insignificant genetic variant?
The problem motivating clinicians was not that the human
beneficiary envisioned by policy makers did not exist but that
it was crowded out by the unintended consequences of pop-
ulation screening. By seizing biochemical measures, newborn
screening revealed a spectrum of abnormalities only some of
which were biologically relevant but all of which were socially
significant. In other words, even if the screening result was
clinically ambivalent, families and geneticists still needed to
respond.
In sum, the implementation of the expanded screening
program unmasked the program’s presumed potential to pre-
vent as overly simplistic and optimistic. Conditions were more
complex, recalcitrant, and varied than anticipated. If, as Peirce
suggests, a technology’s meaning emerges from its conse-
quences, frontline workers in newborn screening increasingly
saw the technology as occasionally preventative but also as
harmful for some families and more often needlessly worrying
parents. The dominant experience of screening results was
figuring out what the results meant, not how they could save
a baby.
Discrepancies between Potentiality and
Experiences in the Clinic?
Peirce presumed continuity between potentiality and reality,
but in newborn screening, dissonance reigned. The initial
policy expectations for expanded newborn screening set the
broad parameters for the experience of screening in the clinic.
Yet policy visions of newborn screening making a difference
in newborn lives fell short of the anticipated “benefits.” The
reality of newborn screening was more ambivalent, including
both “pluses and minuses,” “benefits and frustrations,” and
even “collateral damage.” The meanings of newborn screening
thus emerged from how a positive screen became networked
into the operating procedures of the clinic and the lifeworld
of parents. In light of the discussion of potentiality in the
introduction to this special issue of Current Anthropology
(Taussig, Hoeyer, and Helmreich 2013), the gap between pre-
sumed benefits and actual experience mobilizes a second
meaning of potentiality as a choice through which actors drive
an object (in this case, newborn screening technologies) to
transform. Policy makers could either redefine newborn
screenings’ potential to save babies, or they could change the
technology to achieve the purported goal. This, however, is
not what happened. Instead, the technology’s original poten-
tial was reinvigorated in spite of growing evidence that the
consequences of screening were not exclusively beneficial.
How, then, did the growing dissonance affect policy dis-
course? Most of the myriad effects of newborn screening did
not travel easily into the policy world. The semiotic networks
were only loosely connected. The suffering of the family who
lost a child to VLCADD was private, and the frustrations of
newborn screening’s ambiguity were buffered in clinical in-
teractions; neither is included in evaluation statistics. Policy
makers’ responses took three forms: dismissal, repair, and
reenvisioning newborn screening. When journalists or social
scientists publicized some of these unintended consequences,
parent advocates argued categorically that “newborn screening
saves lives every day” while their allies at the ACMG equally
emphatically asserted that newborn screening was “the most
significant public health program of the past 50 years” (Wat-
son, Howell, and Rinaldo 2011:278).12 The bottom-line re-
action was dismissal. At best, policy makers interpreted these
reports as indicative of the need for better education and
clinician-family communication rather than epistemic un-
certainties deeply embedded in screening programs.
Newborn screening stakeholders have engaged in an im-
pressive research endeavor to repair one inevitable conse-
12. See the comments section following the MSNBC article on
false positives: http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/42829175/ns/today
-today_health/t/babies-blood-tests-can-end-false-positive-screening
-scares/ (accessed May 30, 2011). See also our reply to this defense of
the program (Timmerman and Buchbinder 2011).
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quence of any screening program. Policy makers were most
concerned with the high rate of false positives as recorded in
outcome statistics. To address this problem, one of the Re-
gional Genetics and Newborn Screening Collaboratives
funded by the Health Resources and Service Administration
of the Maternal and Child Health Bureau created a web-based
data reporting and collection system to pool newborn screen-
ing data. By March 2011, the project had gathered data from
47 US states and Puerto Rico and an additional 80 newborn
screening programs in 45 countries. This enabled researchers
to compare data from approximately 25–30 million newborns
whose newborn screening results were negative with 10,742
true positive cases. With these data, the researchers were able
to refine screening cutoff points for various biomarkers
(McHugh et al. 2011). This international collaboration thus
attempted to avoid needlessly alarming parents by reducing
false positives and avoiding what might be preventable mor-
bidity and mortality by reducing false negatives. In the context
of our analysis, this project aims to fine-tune disease biology
to determine the conditions under which newborn screening
is most effective.
It was the third reaction of policy makers—invigorating
newborn screening’s potential for prevention—that was most
striking. In December 2010, the National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development, the National Human Ge-
nome Research Institute, and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) Office of Rare Diseases Research sponsored a summit
in Rockville, Maryland, to set a research agenda for the future
of newborn screening.13 This imaginary future—as articulated
by academic and industry experts, lay advocates, and federal
agency officials—envisioned a further expansion of screening
to include exome or genome sequencing. The implementation
of comprehensive genetic sequencing technologies at birth
would aim to identify a wide spectrum of adult-onset diseases
and additional clinically relevant information, such as be-
havioral traits, drug response, and carrier status. In this par-
adigm, parents might be informed not only that their infant
had a metabolic condition but also that he had increased odds
for male pattern baldness or ulcerative colitis, an abacavir
sensitivity, or that he was a carrier for hemochromatosis. Such
screening could be integrated into electronic health records
to provide a set of personalized health guidelines. Although
the workshop participants agreed that the technology for such
screening was still too slow, imprecise, and costly, they dis-
cussed preliminary pilot studies that could test the feasibility
of their visions. In this summit, newborn screening was pre-
sented as a gateway for universal personalized medicine.14
This molecularization of newborn screening reaffirms hu-
man biology as both a limitless source of knowledge and as
a site of intervention that can pave the way for a better future.
13. http://www.genome.gov/Pages/PolicyEthics/StaffArticles
/Newborn_Screening_Meeting_Summary.pdf (accessed June 2, 2011).
14. This paragraph and the previous one draw from the concluding
chapter of Timmermans and Buchbinder (2013).
Such visions of technological potential reinscribe genetics as
a divination of humanness (Nelkin and Lindee 2004). That
such an image would emerge at birth suggests endless op-
portunities for manipulation across the life course. As with
the initial expansion of newborn screening, this ascribed po-
tential aims to gather resources for technology adoption.
It is not only policy makers who reinvigorated potentiality
in spite of recalcitrant realities. Clinicians and parents in our
study also fell back on reiterating the promises of the screening
program. A geneticist reflected to the parents of a child di-
agnosed with propionic acidemia, a condition that can lead
to complications in spite of early treatment: “We had that
discussion today about newborn screening for another family
of disorders, which is becoming possible, but the interventions
are even more dicey than these, and you know, I point out
childhood leukemia. When we first started treating it we made
the kids miserable and they died anyway. Now, 80% or 85%
are cured. [If] we didn’t do [the experimental treatment],
then you wouldn’t be where you are now. So you only want
to do better each time.” Comparing newborn screening to
childhood leukemia suggested that more visibility translated
into more knowledge about disease and would, it is hoped,
transform into better treatments because of incremental learn-
ing. And nearly all families, regardless of their actual expe-
rience with newborn screening, agreed with the mother who
reiterated the promise of newborn screening in her own
words: “Better to be safe than sorry, we really believe.”
Surrounded by accumulated clinical experience, potenti-
ality did not always yield but lingered persuasively. Potenti-
ality—as parents, geneticists, and policy makers intuitively
knew—was powerful precisely because it was independent of
other phenomena but could become dependent on anything.
And in turn, other phenomena could become dependent on
it. Pragmatically speaking, potentiality mattered not because
of the consequences it manifested but because indeterminacy
left all consequences open. Newborn screening demonstrated
the power of potentiality—dreams, visions, action plans,
promises, aims—to trump facts and generalizable laws. One
of the powers of potentiality is to raise hope, a “what if”
question (Altelius 2007; Shim, Russ, and Kaufman 2006). That
“what if” essence is lost when potentiality does not match
experiences; yet, for the time being, potentiality helps buffer
inconvenient truths about the limitations of newborn screen-
ing to fulfill the promise of secondary prevention in every
positive screen. As Latour’s (1987) reanalysis of Evans-
Pritchard’s work on the Azande shows, an apparent irration-
ality may disappear if we follow how semiotic networks
strengthen some links and weaken others.
In the policy world and the clinic, pledging to the promise
of a biomedical technology offered a distraction from the
reality at hand. At the NIH policy summit mentioned above,
the vision of whole genome sequencing had the typical func-
tion of energizing diverse stakeholders behind a common goal
and summoning resources. At the same time, the new vision
distracted from the growing pains of implementing the cur-
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rent newborn screening program. In the clinic, the reactive
character of restating the promise of newborn screening was
even more apparent. When parents struggled with the un-
certainty of not knowing that their newborn was diseased,
the attitude of “better safe than sorry” suggested that the
current harm was irrelevant if the future would be safe. The
geneticist’s comparison with leukemia tapped into powerful
moral altruism used to frame medical procedures such as
organ transplantation (Fox and Swazey 1974), autopsies
(Timmermans 2006), and randomized clinical trials (Marks
1997): you may not benefit directly, but future generations
could take advantage of your sacrifice. In all instances, reit-
erating potentiality helped to downplay the murkiness of cur-
rent reality in favor of a brighter future. Potentiality had this
consoling effect by creating a temporal and spatial separation
between the here and now and the far-off there and then.
Rather than unmasking potentiality as hype, renewing poten-
tiality thus served to draw attention away from a discrepant
present.
Because potentiality is independent of present realities, it
inevitably comes at a cost for families whose experiences no
longer fit a salvation narrative. As we saw, hope individualized
suffering as unique and rendered the variety of consequences
in the clinic invisible to policy intervention. Moreover, the
line between potentiality and experienced realities could start
to blur. Thus, when screening advocates asserted that newborn
screening saves lives every day and is the most significant
public health program of the last 50 years, they rendered
contradictory signs silent for the larger aim of actualizing a
promise. Here, we see a displacement of goals in which the
potential of newborn screening was upheld as a reality even
though there was no epidemiological or public health evidence
for either assertion. Such reification of potentialities carries
great risk because it depends on the continued suppression
of evidence and rhetorical assertion of benefit.
Conclusion
There is a well-known academic joke in which a physicist, a
chemist, and an economist are stranded on an island with
nothing to eat. A can of soup washes ashore. The physicist
says, “Let’s smash the can open with a rock.” The chemist
says, “Let’s build a fire and heat the can first.” The economist
says, “Let’s assume that we have a can opener.” The punch
line of this joke is not only that economists are unrealistic
but also the opposite: that potentiality creates a world on
which realities travel in spite of unknown feasibility.
A pressing theoretical issue is the relationship of potentiality
to actual experiences. From a semiotic perspective, imbuing
a medical technology with potential requires broadening and
deepening the technology’s ability to act in the world, often
in a way that is both underspecified and grand. Much is
anticipated with few details provided about how goals will
actually be achieved. Such translations are relatively open
ended: potentiality implies an aspiration, not an actual result.
Yet potentiality also sets up an expectation for what a tech-
nology should be able to achieve. Within Peirce’s categorical
scheme, potentiality yields to actuality. The recent history of
hyped-up potential in genetics, genomics, nanotechnologies,
epigenetics, and stem cell research shows that technologies
weather the dissonance between hope and disappointment.
Indeed, Brown argued that unfulfilled potential tends not to
undermine technologies because “it would be impossible to
fully disentangle present hype from future reality” (Brown
2003:16). We noted that within a rapidly innovating field,
rearticulating hope and aspiration intrinsic to potentiality can
supersede inconvenient realities. The price of downplaying
reality for a brighter future, however, is that some realities
no longer count. In the clinic and the policy world, poten-
tiality, actuality, and generalizability—even of the same phe-
nomenon—may thus remain distinct, coexisting simulta-
neously in uneasy tension, each generating different and
occasionally contradictory consequences depending on the
specificity of the situation at hand.
Visions of the capacity of diagnostic technologies to change
the present for a beneficial future enable the collection of
resources, the projection of state populations (Zhu 2013), and
the construction of futures through past analogies (Gam-
meltoft 2013). But is this only a story about what it means
to be human (Chinese, Vietnamese, or American)? Along with
Zhu, Gammeltoft, and other scholars of reproductive tech-
nologies (Press et al. 1998; Rapp 2000), we find that rather
than reassure and predict, in practice these predictive tech-
nologies amplify worry and uncertainty about abnormality or
disability. These anxieties follow from deeply rooted socio-
political and historical national and global developments. At
the same time, however, there are other histories at play,
histories of machines and of people looking for ways to render
these machines functional and, occasionally, fun. Also, there
are histories of how biomedicine finds a foothold in certain
niches and of how prospective parents across the globe consult
white-coated experts. Because it remains unencumbered by
practicalities but may connect disparate elements, potentiality
goes beyond what it means to be human to tie these hetero-
geneous elements together into a better future. By following
consequences as they develop in multiple areas, a pragmatist
approach allows us to see the gains and losses of making
health care policy on technology’s potential.
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